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ABSTRACT: Deliberation dialogues involve reasoning about the appropriate course or courses of action for a group
to undertake. No models currently exist for the conduct of such dialogues. Beginning with an analysis of the
differences between deliberations and other types of dialogue (such as negotiations or information-seeking
dialogues), we propose a generic framework in which to develop such models. We then consider various
instantiations of our generic deliberation framework so as to illustrate its applicability.

1. Introduction
Argumentation is increasingly important in computer science, for example in the design of
systems of autonomous software agents (Parsons et al. 1998, Jennings et al. 2001). Recently, the
use of argumentation in such applications has focused on formal dialogue systems and in this
work the typology of dialogues of Walton and Krabbe (1995) has been influential. This typology
identifies several primary categories of dialogue, distinguished by their initial situations, the
goals of each of their participants, and the goals of the dialogue itself (which may differ from
those of its participants). The dialogue types are: Information-seeking dialogues, in which a
participant who wishes to obtain the presently unknown answer to some question seeks to get it
from another participant who does know; Inquiries, in which all participants collaborate to
answer an open factual question to which none initially has the answer; Persuasion dialogues, in
which a participant who endorses some proposition seeks to convince others to accept it;
Negotiations, in which participants seek to agree on how to divide a scarce resource among
themselves; Deliberations, in which participants discuss what action is to be taken in some
situation; and Eristic (strife-ridden) dialogues, in which participants spar verbally, for example in
an attempt to vent perceived grievances. While this typology is quite rich, Walton and Krabbe do
not claim it is comprehensive. Many real-world dialogues are actually combinations of these
different types; for example, human purchase negotiations may include periods of informationseeking, persuasion and deliberation interactions. Each of these types can be seen in the
paradigm example of Parsons et al. 1998, in which agents collaborate to furnish a room.
Formal models have been developed for persuasion dialogues (Traum and Allen 1992,
Walton and Krabbe 1995, Dignum et al. 2000a & b, Prakken 2000), for information-seeking
dialogues (Hulstijn 2000) and for negotiation dialogues (Amgoud et al. 2000a, Hulstijn 2000).
Formal models have also been proposed for combinations of dialogue-types (Reed 1998,
McBurney and Parsons 2001a). Less attention has been paid to models for deliberation
dialogues, despite their importance. Indeed, a major part of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research
concerns the design of autonomous entities, such as robots, able to devise sequences of actions to
achieve pre-determined goals. Given such a focus on action and the increasing focus in AI on
collaborative decision-making, it is surprising that models for deliberation dialogue have not
been a feature of AI research. To our knowledge, only one project – the TRAINS project of
Allen et al. (1995) – ostensibly seeks to model a deliberation dialogue, and this, as we show in
Section 8, is instead modelled as a two-way persuasion dialogue.
In this paper, we present a formal and implementable model for deliberation dialogues
between autonomous agents. We begin in Section 2 by presenting a formal model of dialogue
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games, and then proceed in Section 3 to discuss the distinguishing characteristics of
deliberations. Section 4 contains our eight-stage model for deliberation dialogues, while Section
5 presents the dialogue-game rules we specify to implement this model. Section 6 examines the
potential of our formalism for use in automated dialogues, and presents a portfolio of
mechanisms for the participating agents to enable a deliberation dialogue to be generated
automatically. Our mechanisms are analogous to recent work in automated agent negotiations.
We present a simple example dialogue in Section 7 and conclude with a brief discussion of
future work in Section 8.
2. Dialogue Games
Formal dialogue games were first proposed in philosophy for the study of fallacies (Hamblin
1970, 1971, MacKenzie 1979) and have recently found application in Artificial Intelligence
(Amgoud et al. 2000a, 2000b, Bench-Capon et al. 2000, Hulstijn et al. 2000, Stathis 2000).
Building on (Walton & Krabbe 1995, Prakken 2000) in abstracting from the rules for any one
game, we can identify five types of dialogue game rules, as follows.
•

Commencement Rules: Rules which define the circumstances under which the dialogue
commences.

•

Locution Rules: Rules which indicate what utterances are permitted. Typically, legal
locutions permit participants to assert propositions, permit others to question or contest prior
assertions, and permit those asserting propositions which are subsequently questioned or
contested to justify their assertions. Justifications may involve the presentation of a proof of
the proposition or an argument for it, and such presentations may also be legal utterances.

•

Combination Rules: Rules which define the dialogical contexts under which particular
locutions are permitted or not, or obligatory or not. For instance, it may not be permitted for a
participant to assert a proposition p and subsequently the proposition ¬p in the same
dialogue, without in the interim having retracted the former assertion. If a dialogue has an
underlying logic, then the rules of inference of this logic will be combination rules of the
dialogue, which may for example permit one participant to infer a proposition from one or
more propositions in the commitment store of another participant.

•

Commitment Rules: Rules which define the circumstances under which participants express
commitment to a proposition. Typically, the assertion of a claim p in the debate is defined as
indicating to the other participants some level of commitment to, or support for, the claim. In
a negotiation dialogue, for example, assertion of an offer may express a willingness to
undertake a transaction on the terms contained in the offer. Since Hamblin (1970), formal
dialogue systems typically establish and maintain public sets of commitments, called
commitment stores, for each participant; these stores are usually non-monotonic, in the sense
that participants can also retract committed claims, although possibly only under defined
circumstances.

•

Termination Rules: Rules which define the circumstances under which the dialogue ends.
Such rules may also define what is the upshot of a dialogue, e.g. whether the proponent of a
thesis has successfully defended it.
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This model has been used to define a dynamic modal logic formalism for combinations of
dialogue games (McBurney and Parsons 2001a). We next examine distinguishing characteristics
of deliberations, and what implications these have for dialogue game rules.
3. Deliberation Dialogues
What distinguishes deliberation dialogues from other types of dialogue? A first
characteristic arises from the focus of a deliberation, which is about what is to be done in some
situation by some agent, either an individual or a group of individuals. This focus on action
distinguishes deliberation dialogues from inquiry, information-seeking and eristic dialogues,
although not from persuasion and negotiation dialogues; these latter two may also be about
action. Moreover, information-seeking and inquiry dialogues involve a search for the true answer
to some factual question, either by one participant or all. In such a search for truth, appeals to
value assumptions (goals, preferences, etc) would be inappropriate. However, this is not the case
for deliberations, where a course of action may be selected on the basis of such factors.
A second characteristic of deliberation dialogues is the absence of a fixed initial
commitment by any participant on the basic question of the dialogue. Although the participants
may express individual positions about what is to be done, the discussion is a mutual one
directed at reaching a joint decision over a course of action; the actions under consideration,
however, need not be joint, and may indeed be enacted by others. A deliberation dialogue is not,
at least not at its outset, an attempt by one participant to persuade any of the others to agree to an
initially defined proposal. In this respect, deliberation dialogues differ from persuasion
dialogues.
A third characteristic of deliberations relates to their mutual focus. Although the participants
may evaluate proposed courses of actions according to different standards or criteria, these
differences are not with respect to personal interests which they seek to accommodate in the
resulting decision. In this respect, a deliberation dialogue differs from a negotiation dialogue,
which must deal with reconciling competing interests. In a negotiation, for example, it may be
deleterious for a participant to share her information and preferences. But a sharing strategy
should behoove participants in a deliberation; to the extent that agents are unwilling to share
information or preferences, we would define their discussion to be a negotiation and not a
deliberation.
These last two characteristics lead to an important observation about deliberations. An
action-option which is optimal for the group when considered as a whole may be seen as suboptimal from the perspective of each of the participants to the deliberation. This could be
because a demonstration of optimality requires more information than is held by any one
participant at the start of the dialogue, or because individual participants do not consider all the
relevant criteria for assessment. Similarly, an option for which the group has a compelling
argument may be such that no one participant, on his or her own, has such an argument; only by
pooling information or resources is the group able to construct a winning argument for the
option. This characteristic means that the common assumption by agent designers of an
individual rationality condition on agent utterances (e.g. Amgoud et al. 2000a) is not appropriate:
if we were to impose this condition, the optimal option may never be proposed, as no one
participant has, on its own, an acceptable argument for it. We might call the individual rationality
condition narrow rationality and distinguish it from the broader rationality of an agent
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considering both its own arguments and those of the group collectively. Moreover, real-life
deliberations often benefit from whimsical or apparently-random proposals, which lead
participants to discuss creative (“off-the-wall”) alternatives.
How do dialogues commence and proceed? Information-seeking dialogues, persuasions and
inquiries each commence with a question or a statement by a participant and proceed by means
of responses from other participants. Likewise, negotiation dialogues arise when a resource
needs to be divided, and they can commence with a proposal by a participant to divide the
resource in some manner, perhaps optimally for that participant. The negotiation will then
proceed via responses to this proposal, including counter-proposals, which, in the best case,
converge on a mutually acceptable settlement.
A deliberation dialogue arises with a need for action in some circumstance. In general
human discourse, this need may be initially expressed in governing questions which are quite
open-ended, as in Where shall we go for dinner this evening? or How should we respond to the
prospect of global warming? Proposals for actions to address the expressed need may only arise
late in a dialogue, after discussion on the governing question, and discussion on what
considerations are relevant to its resolution. When possible courses of action are proposed, they
may be evaluated on a large number of attributes, including: their direct or indirect costs and
benefits; their opportunity costs; their consequences; their practical feasibility; their ethical,
moral or legal implications; their resourcing implications; their likelihood of realization or of
success; their conformance with other goals or strategies; their timing, duration or location; etc.
To achieve resolution of a deliberation dialogue, one or more participants must make a proposal
for an appropriate course of action. But where do such proposals for action arise? And how do
the participants know when they have identified all the possible alternatives, or at least all those
alternatives worth considering? These are not easy questions, for human or machine deliberators.
Negotiations over multi-attribute outcomes share the characteristic of multi-dimensionality
with deliberations. Research on agent negotiation frameworks has typically made simplifying
assumptions about such attributes and about agents' reactions to them, e.g. that the attribute
values can be partially-ordered and that each agent has a real-valued utility function assigning
values to potential outcomes which can be used to produce a rank order of outcomes on a single
scale (Jennings et al. 2001). We desire not to make such assumptions for our model of
deliberation dialogues, at least not in its most general form.
4. A Formal Model of Deliberations
Guided by the considerations discussed in the previous section, we now present a formal,
high-level model for deliberation dialogues. This builds from the work of Joris Hulstijn (2000),
who presented an idealized, five-stage model for negotiation dialogues, consisting of:
•

Opening the dialogue;

•

Sharing information;

•

Making proposals and counter-proposals;

•

Confirming accepted proposals;

•

Closing the dialogue.
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We propose a similar structure for deliberations.
We also draw on a philosophical model for non-deductive argument termed retroflexive
argumentation, due to Harald Wohlrapp (1998). This talks of a matter-in-question, equivalent to
a governing question or a proposal for action, being considered from a number of different
frames or perspectives; we use the latter term, to avoid confusion with Reed (1998). As
mentioned above, perspectives may be factors such as moral implications, opportunity costs, etc.
An argument for or against a particular option is a partial understanding of that option from one
or more, but rarely all, perspectives. Having heard an argument for or against an option,
Wohlrapp argues, one proceeds by re-examining the underlying assumptions or modifying the
action proposal, in the light of that argument. Thus, an argument against a law permitting
euthanasia may be that such practices are open to abuse of ill patients by malicious relatives. A
retroflexive response to this argument is to modify the proposed law by adding restrictions which
inhibit or preclude such abuses, such as a requirement that the patient be of sound mind and give
prior consent to the act of euthanasia.
With Wohlrapp’s model in mind, we assume that the subject-matter of dialogues can be
represented in a propositional language, with propositions and propositional functions denoted
by lower-case Roman letters, e.g. “p”, “q”. We define the following types of propositions:
•

Questions: A question is a proposition, or a propositional function with one or more free
variables (possibly conjoined with the proposition that exactly one sequence of objects
satisfies the function), denoted by a lower-case Roman letter followed by a question-mark,
e.g. “p?”. A governing question is the overall issue or issues which motivated the
participants to convene the particular deliberation dialogue.

•

Actions: An action is a proposition representing a deed or an act (possibly a speech act)
which may be undertaken or recommended as a result of the deliberation dialogue. The
purpose of the deliberation dialogue is to decide on an answer to the governing question,
which will be some (course of) action. Possible actions are also called action-options.

•

Goals: A goal is a proposition representing a future world state (external to the dialogue),
possibly arising following execution of one or more actions and desired by one or more
participants. Goals express the purpose(s) for which actions are being considered in the
dialogue.

•

Constraints: A constraint is a proposition expressing some limitation on the space of
possible actions.

•

Perspectives: A perspective is a proposition representing a criterion by which a potential
action may be evaluated by a participant.

•

Facts: A fact is a proposition expressing some possible state of affairs in the world external
to the dialogue.

•

Evaluations: An evaluation is a proposition expressing an assessment of a possible action
with respect to a goal, constraint or perspective.

These types are mutually exclusive. With these elements defined, we now present a formal
model of the dialogue itself, which consists of the following eight stages:
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•

Open: Opening of the deliberation dialogue, and the raising of a governing question about
what is to be done.

•

Inform: Discussion of: (a) the governing question; (b) desirable goals; (c) any constraints on
the possible actions which may be considered; (d) perspectives by which proposals may be
evaluated; and (e) any premises (facts) relevant to this evaluation.

•

Propose: Suggesting of possible action-options appropriate to the governing question.

•

Consider: Commenting on proposals from various perspectives.

•

Revise: Revising of: (a) the governing question, (b) goals, (c) constraints, (d) perspectives,
and/or (e) action-options in the light of the comments presented; and the undertaking of any
information-gathering or fact-checking required for resolution. (Note that other types of
dialogues, such as information seeking or persuasion, may be embedded in the deliberation
dialogue at this stage.)

•

Recommend: Recommending an option for action, and acceptance or non-acceptance of this
recommendation by each participant.

•

Confirm: Confirming acceptance of a recommended option by each participant. We have
assumed that all participants must confirm their acceptance of a recommended option for
normal termination.

•

Close: Closing of the deliberation dialogue.

This is a model of an ideal dialogue. The stages may occur in any order, and may be entered
by participants as frequently as desired, subject only to the following constraints:
•

The first stage in every dialogue is the Open stage. Once a second participant enters the
dialogue, the dialogue is said to be “open.”

•

The Open stage may occur only once in any deliberation dialogue. All other stages may
occur more than once.

•

The only stages which must occur in every dialogue which terminates normally are Open
and Close.

•

At least one instance of the Inform stage must precede the first instance of every other stage,
excepting Open and Close.

•

At least one instance of the Propose stage must precede the first instance of the Consider,
Revise, Recommend and Confirm stages.

•

The Confirm stage can only be entered following an instance of a Recommend stage.

•

Upon successful completion of a Confirm stage, the dialogue must enter the Close stage.

•

The last stage in every dialogue which terminates normally is the Close stage.

•

Subject only to the constraints expressed in these rules and constraints expressed in the
locution-combination rules (articulated in the Appendix), participants may enter any stage
from within any other stage at any time.
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Some comments are appropriate on the rules constraining the order of stages. Firstly, the
participants may enter a Close stage more than once in a particular dialogue. As the locution
rules below will demonstrate, participants are required to indicate publicly that they wish to
leave the dialogue. Whenever a participant does this, the dialogue enters a Close stage.
However, the Close stage remains unconcluded, and the dialogue remains open, as long as there
are at least two participants who wish to continue speaking. It is therefore possible for the Close
stage, as with all the other stages except the Open stage, to be entered multiple times in any one
dialogue.
Secondly, we have assumed for simplicity in this initial model that unanimity of the
participants is required for a decision on a course of action to be made. It would be perfectly
possible for the participants to adopt a different procedure for confirmation, such as majority
voting or consensus procedures. We have not done this here, but it is a topic for future work. If
such alternative voting procedures were to be adopted, it would be useful to announce the results
of any votes formally to the participants, with a statement of the group’s decision, just as the
minutes of human meetings usually record these. For this reason, we have demarcated a separate
stage, Confirm, to record final commitments to action. In addition, the requirement that
participants once again assert their endorsement for a particular course of action reinforces their
commitment to this course as the group’s decision. Once all participants have confirmed their
acceptance of a recommended action, the dialogue must end, and any further discussion relevant
to the same governing question can only occur by commencement of a new deliberation
dialogue.
Apart from the constraints listed here, the order of stages is not fixed and participants may
return to different stages multiple times in any one dialogue. Thus, a dialogue undertaken
according to this model may cycle repeatedly through these stages, just as human dialogues do.
In this way, our model gives practical effect to Wohlrapp's model of retroflexive argumentation.
The eightfold model is also quite general; we have not specified the nature of the governing
questions, goals, constraints, facts, action-options, perspectives or evaluations. Nor have we
specified here any particular mechanisms for producing, revising or accepting action-options.
Wohlrapp’s model of retroflexive argumentation and our formalization of it have some
similarities with Imre Lakatos’ theory of mathematical discovery (Lakatos 1976). According to
Lakatos, mathematicians work by proposing statements they believe may be theorems and then
seeking proofs for these. In doing so, a counter-example to the proposed theorem may be found,
which leads the mathematician to modify the proposal. A new attempt at seeking a proof is then
undertaken, with the process repeated until such a time as a theorem is identified for which a
proof can be found. The theories of Lakatos and Wohlrapp may be seen as describing (in part)
arguments which proceed by precization, in the terminology of Arne Naess (1947/1966).
5. A Deliberation Dialogue Game
We now list a set of dialogue-game locutions which, taken together, enable a deliberation
dialogue to be conducted according to the eight-stage model just presented. In this section, we
present only the locutions, and not also the necessary pre-conditions for, and the consequences
of, their utterance; these conditions are presented in detail in the Appendix. We continue to
assume that the subject-matter of dialogues can be represented in a propositional language by
lower-case Roman letters. We denote participating agents by P1, P2, . . . Pi, . . . and we assume
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that a Commitment Store, denoted CS(Pi), exists for each agent Pi. This store contains the
various propositions which the agent has publicly asserted or preferences he or she has declared;
entries in the store are thus of two forms: (a) 2-tuples of the form (type, t), where t is a valid
proposition instance of type type, with type an element of the set: {question, goal, constraint,
perspective, fact, action, evaluation}; and (b) 3-tuples of the form (prefer, a, b), where a and b
are proposition actions. Each store can be viewed by all participants. The permissible locutions
are:


open_dialogue(Pi, q?): Participant Pi proposes the opening of a deliberation dialogue to
consider the governing question q?. A dialogue can only commence with this move.



enter_dialogue(Pj, q?): Participant Pj indicates a willingness to join a deliberation dialogue
to consider the governing question q?. All intending participants other than the mover of
open_dialogue(.) must announce their participation with this move. Note that neither the
open_dialogue(.) nor the enter_dialogue(.) move implies that the speaker accepts that q? is
the most appropriate governing question, only that he or she is willing to enter into a
discussion about it at this time.

•

propose(Pi, type, t): Participant Pi proposes proposition t as a valid instance of type type,
where type is an element of the set {question, goal, constraint, perspective, fact, action,
evaluation}.

•

assert(Pi, type, t): Participant Pi asserts proposition t as a valid instance of type type, where
type is an element of the set {question, goal, constraint, perspective, fact, action,
evaluation}. This is a stronger locution than propose(.), and results in the tuple (type,t) being
inserted into CS(Pi), the Commitment Store of Pi.

•

prefer(Pi, a, b): Participant Pi indicates a preference for action-option a over action-option
b. This locution can only be uttered following utterance (possibly by other participants) of
assert(Pj,evaluation,e) locutions of at least two evaluations e, one of which has a as its first
argument, and one b. This combination rule ensures that preferences expressed in the
dialogue are grounded in an evaluation of each action-option according to some proposed
goal, constraint or perspective, and thus contestable. This locution inserts (prefer, a, b) into
CS(Pi), the Commitment Store of Pi.

•

ask_justify(Pj, Pi, type, t): Participant Pj asks participant Pi to provide a justification of
proposition t of type type, where t is in CS(Pi).

•

move(Pi, action, a): Participant Pi proposes that each participant pronounce on whether they
assert proposition a as the action to be decided upon by the group. This locution inserts
(action,a) into CS(Pi).

•

retract(Pj, locution): Participant Pj expresses a retraction of a previous locution, locution,
where locution is one of three possible utterances: assert(Pj, type, t) or move(Pi, action, a)
or prefer(Pi, a, b) locution. The retraction locution deletes the entry from CS(Pi) which had
been inserted by locution.

•

withdraw_dialogue(Pi,q?): Participant Pi announces her withdrawal from the deliberation
dialogue to consider the governing question q?.
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The locution ask_justify(Pj, Pi, type, t) is a request from participant Pj of participant Pi,
seeking justification from Pi for the assertion that proposition t is a valid instance of type type.
Following this, Pi must either retract the proposition t or shift into an embedded persuasion
dialogue in which Pi seeks to persuade Pj that proposition t is such a valid instance. One could
model such a persuasion dialogue with a formal dialogue-game framework consistent with the
deliberation framework we present here, drawing, for example, on the models proposed by
Walton and Krabbe (1995) or Prakken (2000).
The move(.) locution requests that participants who agree with a particular action being
decided upon by the group should utter an assert(.) locution with respect to this action.
Participants who do not agree that the particular action should be the decision of the group, or
who wish to abstain from pronouncing on the issue, are free not to utter anything in reponse to
the move(.) locution. Because in this model we have assumed unanimity of decision-making,
the Recommend stage is only concluded successfully, and hence the dialogue only proceeds to
the Confirm stage, in the case when all participants respond to the move(.) locution with the
appropriate assert(.) locution.
We next show that our dialogue game framework implements the model for deliberation
dialogues proposed in Section 4.
Proposition: Each of the eight stages of the formal model of deliberation dialogues
presented in Section 4 can be executed by judicious choice of these dialogue-game locutions.
Proof: We consider each stage in turn:
•

A dialogue opens with the locution open_dialogue(Pi, q?) and at least one utterance of
enter_dialogue(Pj,q?), for Pj and Pi distinct participants.

•

The Inform stage consists of utterances of propose(.), assert(.), retract(.) and ask_justify(.)
for some or all of the types goal, constraint, perspective, and fact.

•

The Propose stage consists of one or more utterances of propose(Pi, action, t).

•

The Consider stage consists of utterances of assert(Pi, evaluation, e), prefer(Pj, a, b) and
ask_justify(.).

•

In the Revise stage, a revision a2 to an action a1 proposed earlier may be proposed by means
of the locution propose(Pi, action, a2).

•

The Recommend stage consists of an execution of move(Pi, action, a), possibly followed by
utterances of assert(Pj, action, a), for Pj and Pi distinct participants.

•

The Confirm stage only occurs following a Recommend stage where all participants have
indicated acceptance of the recommended action-option. It then consists of the utterance of
assert(Pj, action, a) by every participant Pj, including the speaker of move(Pi, action, a).

•

The Close stage occurs whenever a participant Pi utters withdraw_dialogue(Pi, q?). A
dialogue closes only when there remain two participants who have not uttered this locution,
and one of them does so.
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As mentioned at the beginning of this section, we have also defined for each locution the
pre-conditions necessary for its legal utterance, and the post-conditions which occur upon its
utterance, and these are presented in the Appendix. The locutions and the associated rules have
been defined in accordance with the principles for rational mutual inquiry proposed by
Hitchcock (1991).
6. Automated Dialogues
One objective of our work is the automation of deliberation dialogues between autonomous
software agents. The formalism we have presented above provides the syntax for such dialogues,
but is not sufficient for automation. Although there are some combination rules precluding or
requiring locutions at various moves, agents still have a great deal of freedom in selecting
utterances. We desire what we term a generative capability, so that dialogues can be generated
automatically. We can achieve this by equipping the participating agents with mechanisms for
deciding a preferred utterance at each move. In essence, these mechanisms are routines which are
invoked by particular dialogue-game locutions, and, once invoked and executed, in turn invoke
other locutions. We propose the following mechanism-types:
•

Recognize Need: A mechanism which recognizes a need for a deliberation dialogue,
enabling an agent to initiate or to enter such a dialogue.

•

Define Problem: Mechanisms which identify and assess relevant questions, goals,
constraints, facts and perspectives, enabling an agent to propose or consider these. As with
purchase preferences provided in advance by a human principal to his or her delegated
software agent in automated electronic commerce, an agent may enter the deliberation
dialogue with these elements pre-determined.

•

Propose Option: A mechanism to identify and assess possible action-options, enabling an
agent to propose options, and to accept (or not) those proposed by others.

•

Consider Proposal: Mechanisms to: (a) assert proposed questions, goals, constraints, facts
and actions with respect to each other; (b) evaluate proposed actions with respect to goals,
constraints or perspectives; and (c) seek appropriate justifications for the assertions of other
participants.

•

Revise Proposal: A mechanism to revise questions, goals, constraints, facts and perspectives
in the light of assert(Pi,evaluation,e) and prefer(Pi,a,b) utterances in the dialogue-game.

•

Move Option: A mechanism to select an action-option to move to the dialogue for joint
acceptance.

•

Withdraw: A mechanism to enable an agent to decide to withdraw from the dialogue at any
time.

Proposition: Autonomous software agents equipped with the mechanisms listed here can
engage in deliberation dialogues of the form presented in Sections 4 and 5 automatically.
Proof: On the basis of the mechanism definitions, the proof is straightforward; this can be
seen by considering the impact of each permitted locution on the listed mechanisms, and vice
versa.
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This proposition says that the dialogue-game formalism we have presented for deliberation
dialogues is generative (i.e. generates dialogues automatically) for agents with a certain highlevel architecture. Similar approaches have been proposed in recent agent negotiation
architectures which do not use argumentation. For example, Peyman Faratin (2000) equips
agents engaged in automated negotiations with mechanisms for: (a) deciding their responses to
multi-attribute offers; (b) proposing new offers involving different trade-offs of the same set of
attributes as prior offers; and (c) proposing new offers having different attributes to prior offers.
In Jennings et al. (2001), these mechanisms are called heuristic approaches to automated
negotiation, and are distinguished from approaches using either economic game theory or
argumentation. We believe our model is the first in which heuristic and argumentation
approaches have been combined. In other work, two of us have proposed an evolutionary
computational architecture as the basis for a generative mechanism (McBurney and Parsons
2001b).
7. Example
We consider a simplified example regarding what action to take regarding potential health
hazards from the use of cellular phones. The dialogue moves are annotated following each move.
•

open_dialogue(P1,Do what about mobile phone health risk?)
This move is the first move in the Open stage of the dialogue.

•

enter_dialogue(P2, Do what about mobile phone health risk?)
With the entry of a second participant, the dialogue may be said to commence.

•

enter_dialogue(P3, Do what about mobile phone health risk?)
A third participant also enters the dialogue.

•

propose(P2, perspective, degree of risk)

Participant P2 proposes the degree of risk as a perspective from which to consider the
question. With this move, the dialogue enters an Inform stage.
•

propose(P3, perspective, economic cost)
Participant P3 proposes economic cost as a perspective from which to consider the question.

•

propose(P1, action, prohibit sale)

Participant P1 proposes prohibition of sale of phones as an action-option. With this move,
the dialogue enters a Propose stage.
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propose(P3, action, do nothing)
Participant P3 proposes doing nothing as an action-option.

•

assert(P1, evaluation, prohibit sale from a degree of risk perspective is lowest risk)

Participant P1 asserts that from the perspective of the degree of risk, prohibiting the sale of
phones is the lowest risk action-option possible. With this move, the dialogue enters a Consider
stage.
•

assert(P3, evaluation, prohibit sale from an economic cost perspective is high-cost)

Participant P3 asserts that from the perspective of economic cost, prohibiting sale is a highcost option.
•

propose(P1, action, limit usage)

Participant P1 proposes limiting usage as an action-option, thus responding retroflexively to
the previous two assert(Pi,evaluation,e) locutions. With this move, the dialogue enters a Revise
stage.
•

propose(P2, perspective, feasibility)

Participant P2 proposes feasibility as a perspective from which to consider the question.
With this move, the dialogue enters another Inform stage.
•

assert(P2, evaluation, limit usage from a feasibility perspective is impractical)

Participant P2 asserts that from the perspective of feasibility, limiting usage is not practical.
With this move, the dialogue enters another Consider stage.
•

prefer(P1, prohibit sale, limit usage)
Participant P1 expresses a preference for the option of prohibiting the sale of phones over
limiting their usage. The utterance is valid at this point, since each action-option has
appeared as the first argument in a proposition e of type evaluation in an assert(Pi,
evaluation, e) locution.

For reasons of space, we have not included any retraction locutions, nor included any goals,
constraints or facts. For the same reason, we have not continued the example to the Recommend,
Confirm and Close stages. Although very simplified, the example does show the usage of some
types of locutions; it also demonstrates the way in which a dialogue may move between stages as
it proceeds. Such cycling between stages is commonplace in human deliberations, where
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comments, arguments and preferences uttered by one participants are likely to provoke others to
think of new goals, constraints, facts, perspectives and action-options.
8. Discussion
In this paper we have proposed the first formal model of a general deliberation dialogue,
grounding it in the philosophy of argumentation and using a dialogue-game framework to ensure
implementability. Our model creates a public space in which multiple participants may interact
to jointly decide on a course of action, and our structure and rules seek to define the nature of
these interactions. In enabling participants to contribute to a joint discussion which may proceed
iteratively and to view each other’s commitment stores, our model has some similarities with
“blackboard” architectures in computer science (Nii 1986). We do not capture, in our model, all
types of deliberation dialogues; nor is it sufficient for automated dialogues. To generate
dialogues automatically we would need to equip the participating agents with mechanisms
enabling them to choose between the permitted locutions at each move in the dialogue-game. We
have outlined a portfolio of such mechanisms in this paper, analogous to recent work (not using
argumentation) in devising frameworks for automated negotiation. Although at a high level, we
believe our work is the first in which a generative formalism has been proposed for agents
engaged in deliberative argument.
Much research effort in Artificial Intelligence (AI) over the last thirty years has concerned
the task of designing robots so that, when given a specific goal, such as moving into the next
room, they may determine a plan for achievement of this goal. Because this research area, known
within AI as “Planning”, concerns consideration of possible actions, it would seem amenable to
the application of deliberation dialogues. However, the only research program known to us
which combines AI Planning with models of dialogues is the TRAINS project (Allen et al.
1995), which constructed an intelligent computer assistant for a human rail-freight scheduler. For
this project, actual human-human conversations in the specific domain were first recorded and
analyzed as a basis for the design of the machine-human interactions. Although the two
participants in the TRAINS system, machine and human, discuss a course of action, and thus
ostensibly engage in deliberation, the design of the system assumes that the machine and the
human-user each begin the dialogue with a privately-developed proposal for action, which they
then present to one another. Thus, in the terminology of Walton and Krabbe (1995), their
conversation is closer to a two-way persuasion dialogue than to a true deliberation. In addition,
the TRAINS system design assumes that the human user’s goal is paramount, and that the
machine participates in the dialogue to assist the human to find an effective plan for achievement
of this goal. Thus, the model of dialogue assumes a specific relationship of inequality between
the two participants. By contrast, our model of deliberation dialogue is not limited in this way.
Other work in Artificial Intelligence has also come close to developing a formal model of
deliberation dialogues without yet doing so. Frank Dignum and colleagues have used dialogue
models for the creation of a collective intention and for team-formation by autonomous software
agents (Dignum et al. 2000a, 2000b) seeking to engage in some joint activity. This research also
arises from within an AI Planning tradition, where the overall goal is assumed pre-determined.
As with the TRAINS project, while such a context does not preclude use of deliberation
dialogues, the focus of the research has been on other types of dialogue. The models of Dignum
et al. are explicit combinations of persuasion and negotiation dialogues, the latter embedded
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within the former. The example dialogue of Parsons et al. (1998), in which agents collaborate to
furnish a room, is a mixture of deliberation and negotiation, but this is not modeled formally.
Later work by Parsons and colleagues (e.g. Amgoud et al. 2000a, 2000b) has presented dialoguegame models of negotiations. To date, negotiation has been the primary focus of AI researchers
exploring automated interactions between autonomous software agents (Jennings et al. 2001),
perhaps because of the potential applications to the design of electronic-commerce systems.
This focus has led to work on distributed proof procedures in multi-agent negotiations (e.g.
Fisher 2000) which may be seen as analogous to the model of distributed decision-making we
have presented here. By contrast, AI researchers using dialogue-games in the legal domain have
primarily focused on persuasion dialogues (e.g. Prakken 2000).
We are exploring a number of extensions of the work in this paper. Firstly, we seek to
model and automate more general classes of deliberation dialogue. For example, many human
deliberations exhibit strong disagreement between the participants over the relevance and
importance of different perspectives. We will explore the question of how our dialogue-game
may be extended to allow for arguments over these. Secondly, we plan to enable discussion over
confirmation procedures, so that, for example, majority or plurality voting may be used instead
of the unanimity now required in the Confirm stage. To do this will require the addition of a
procedural discussion stage (or stages) to the dialogue model, along with locutions appropriate
for such discussions. If a group of participants were to engage regularly in deliberation dialogues
using the same decision-procedures, these procedural discussions would not need to be
undertaken in each dialogue but could be assumed constant. Within the multi-agent systems
community, systems for interaction between autonomous agents with such pre-determined rules
of encounter have been called Institutions (Sierra et al. 1998).
A third extension could involve the formal modeling of trust and obligation among the
participants. John Forester (1999) argues that, in the domain of land-use planning, a key task of
planning professionals in facilitating public policy development and decision-making is the
development of trust between the various stakeholders and the planning professional. Recent
research in AI has looked at the formal modeling of trust and obligation (e.g. McNamara and
Prakken 1998). Finally, our explicit typing of propositions (into facts, goals, constraints, etc)
may facilitate the mathematical representation of dialogues under this model by means of the
lambda-calculus (Church 1940), a representation we may also explore.
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Appendix:
In this section, we present the full list of pre-conditions and post-conditions for each
locution defined in Section 5.
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open_dialogue(.)
•

Locution: open_dialogue(Pi, q?)

•

Meaning: Participant Pi proposes the opening of a deliberation dialogue to consider the
governing question q?. A dialogue can only commence with this move.

•

Preconditions: No preconditions within the dialogue..

•

Response: None required. Other intending participants may respond with the
enter_dialogue(.) locution.

•

Commitment Store Update: No effects.

enter_dialogue(.)
•

Locution: enter_dialogue(Pj, q?)

•

Meaning: Intending participant Pj indicates a willingness to join a deliberation dialogue
to consider the governing question q?. All intending participants other than the speaker
of open_dialogue(.) must announce their participation with this move.

•

Preconditions: A participant Pi, where Pi and Pj are distinct, must previously have
uttered the locution open_dialogue(Pi, q?).

•

Response: None required. This locution is a pre-condition for all locutions other than
open_dialogue(.), i.e. the intending speaker Pj of any other locution must have previously
uttered enter_dialogue(Pj, q?). As soon as one participant has uttered the
enter_dialogue(Pj, q?) locution, the dialogue is said to be Open.

•

Commitment Store Update: No effects.

Since all the locutions listed below have a common precondition, namely that the speaker Pj
have previously uttered either open_dialogue(Pj, q?) or enter_dialogue(Pj, q?), we do not list
this precondition under each locution, but only those specific to the locution.
•

•

propose(.)
•

Locution: propose(Pi, type, t)

•

Meaning: Participant Pi proposes proposition t as a valid instance of type type, where
type is an element of the set {question, goal, constraint, perspective, fact, action,
evaluation}.

•

Preconditions: No specific preconditions.

•

Response: None required.

•

Commitment Store Update: No effects.

assert(.)
•

Locution: assert(Pi, type, t)
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•

Meaning: Participant Pi asserts proposition t as a valid instance of type type, where type
is an element of the set {question, goal, constraint, perspective, fact, action, evaluation}.

•

Preconditions: No specific preconditions.

•

Response: None required.

•

Commitment Store Update: The 2-tuple (type,t) is inserted into CS(Pi), the Commitment
Store of Pi.

prefer(.)
•

Locution: prefer(Pi, a, b)

•

Meaning: Participant Pi indicates a preference for action-option a over action-option b.

•

Preconditions: Some participants Pj and Pk, possibly including Pi, must previously have
uttered the locutions assert(Pj, evaluation, e) and assert(Pk, evaluation, f), where e and f
are evaluation propositions which refer respectively to action-options a and b.

•

Response: None required.

•

Commitment Store Update: The 3-tuple (prefer, a, b) is inserted into CS(Pi), the
Commitment Store of Pi.

ask_justify(.)
•

Locution: ask_justify(Pj, Pi, type, t)

•

Meaning: Participant Pj asks participant Pi to provide a justification of proposition t of
type type, where t is in CS(Pi).

•

Preconditions: Participant Pi has previously uttered the locution assert(Pi, type, t).

•

Response: Pi must either retract the proposition t or seek to persuade Pj in an embedded
persuasion dialogue that proposition t is a valid instance of type type.

•

Commitment Store Update: No effect.

move(.)
•

Locution: move(Pi, action, a)

•

Meaning: Participant Pi proposes that each participant pronounce on whether they assert
proposition a as the action to be decided upon by the group.

•

Preconditions: Some participant Pj, possibly Pi, must previously have uttered either
propose(Pi, action, a) or assert(Pi, action, a).

•

Response: None required. Other participants Pjk, distinct from Pi, who wish to support
proposition a as the action to be decided upon by the group can respond with locution
assert(Pk, action, a).

•

Commitment Store Update: The 2-tuple (action,a) is inserted into CS(Pi).

retract(.)
•

Locution: retract(Pi, locution)
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•

Meaning: Participant Pi expresses a retraction of a previous utterance locution, where
locution is one of the following three locutions: assert(Pi, type, t), move(Pi, action, a) or
prefer(Pi, a, b).

•

Preconditions: Participant Pi must have previously uttered and not subsequently retracted
the locution locution.

•

Response: None required.

•

Commitment Store Update: Depending on which of the three locutions mentioned in the
preconditions was uttered previously, one of: (a) the 2-tuple (type,t); (b) the 2-tuple
(action,a); or (c) the 3-tuple (prefer,a,b) is deleted from from CS(Pi).

withdraw_dialogue(.)
•

Locution: withdraw_dialogue(Pi, q?)

•

Meaning: Participant Pi announces her withdrawal from the deliberation dialogue to
consider the governing question q?.

•

Preconditions: No specific preconditions.

•

Response: None required. If only two participants remain in a dialogue and one of these
utters this locution, the dialogue terminates.

•

Commitment Store Update: No effects.
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